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1. Introduction
In this paper I address the question whether democracies should actively protect the 
truth and how far this protection should go. I would like to start with a remark that 
the lack of such protection has contributed to the crisis we have been observing in the 
West for years now.
It is widely accepted in the literature on the subject that western liberal democracies 
are witness to a major societal change with strong repercussions for politics. The current 
moment in history is characterized by a lack of trust in democratic institutions, political 
parties and the media2. As a result we observe an unprecedented rise of populism all over 
the world3. It is estimated that in the last decades populist parties tripled their support in 
Europe and got their leaders into governments in 11 countries4. The strong presence of 
populist parties in Europe, often with clear nationalistic and xenophobic agenda, leads 
to political tensions within the whole camp of western democracies. Various factors 
have been brought forward as an explanation of the observed worrisome phenomena, 
including economic inequalities and globalization, partisan polarisation and the crisis of 
identity5. However, researchers and commentators agree that developments in internet 
communication and the rise of new media are one of the key contributing factors.
Technological advancement and the creation of social-media platforms enable dis-
semination of disinformation, propaganda and falsehood on an unprecedented scale. 
The so-called fake news becomes an important part of the information marketplace, 
competing with unbiased information and slowly reaching the level of dissemination that 
actually influences the political process. The cases of Brexit or the elections in Poland 
in 2015 demonstrate how disinformation about the real costs of the EU membership or 
media hysteria about the threat of illegal immigration can have a bearing on the results 
of voting. Fake news spread by social media platforms is not the only problem, though.
1 ORCID number: 0000-0003-4650-5234. E-mail: klinowski@gmail.com
2 See e.g.: 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer. Executive Summary, Chicago 2019. See also: Who Can You Trust?: How 
Technology Brought Us Together and Why It Might Drive Us Apart, London 2017, p. 41.
3 For a definition of populism see: C. Mudde The Populist Zeitgeist, “Government and Opposition” 2004/39, pp. 541–563.
4 P. Lewis, S. Clarke, C. Barr, N. Kommenda, J. Holder, Revealed: one in four Europeans vote populist, “The Guardian”, 
20 November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/revealed-one-in-four-europeans-
vote-populist, accessed on: 19 August 2020.
5 T. Cooper, J. Thomas, Nature or Nurture: A Crisis of Trust and Reason in the Digital Age, London 2019, pp. 11–39. 
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According to Yascha Mounk, three major factors guaranteed the stability of liberal 
democracies in the past, one of them being mass communications control by political 
and financial elites6. Other authors also underscore the role of quality of mass com-
munication and media for the preservation and advancement of the model of liberal 
democracy7. That quality according to Mounk was assured by the political and financ-
ial mainstream, because liberal elites usually safeguard a respectful evidence-based 
discourse, which forms a part of their identity based on high education. But this iden-
tity and, even more, the standards that the liberal elites imposed on media and mass 
communication were also seen as a cultural or political extortion by those members 
of society who considered themselves marginalized and by those participants of the 
political discourse, who found themselves voiceless, being too far right or too far left 
for mainstream communication. Therefore, the harmful and untamed spread of fake 
news and disinformation was caused by the erosion of the system of mainstream media 
as well as by developments of new media platforms8. This has tremendous, though 
often underrated, political consequences, since mainstream media play an impor-
tant role as a moderator of democratic debate and a tool of democratic control over 
the government. Furthermore, the removal of communication barriers allows vari-
ous like-minded individuals, whose identity lies outside of the mainstream, to con-
nect, share ideas and gain support. This leads to the ascent of populistic movements 
across the globe.
Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, it is justifiable to assume that tech-
nical (social media) as well as substantive (lack of control over the public discourse) 
changes in mass communication and the media market are amongst the most important 
causes of the current crisis of democracy. The truth and factual correctness were the 
central ideas for the mainstream liberal media. Of course the media often lie to and 
manipulate public opinion, but the idea of truth has never been dispelled or even chal-
lenged by their representatives. Truth was also favoured by a narrow bandwidth of 
traditional communication channels. The press, TV channels and other forms of dis-
seminating information have a finite capacity, so false information cannot dominate 
over public opinion as long as the majority of media creators adhere to the principle of 
factual correctness as opposed to disinformation. Everything changes with the internet 
and digitization, since tokens of information, regardless of its factual relevance, can 
be produced in infinite numbers. Thus, false or fake news can easily compete with 
and outnumber the truth.
Hence, the rise of populism in Europe is not only caused by the inability on the 
part of states to fulfil important societal needs (i.e. the crisis of a sense of commu-
nity), solve important problems (i.e. economic inequalities) or address existential fears 
(i.e. uncontrolled immigration), but also by the fact that western states have remained 
unprotected and unprepared for the mass inflow of fakes and false information which 
fuelled populist movements. What’s more, political authorities tend to overlook the fact 
that voters are susceptible to manipulation and propaganda. They don’t usually actively 
seek true information and are highly prone to fakes, as long as these fakes uphold their 
6 Another two were: economic growth and low ethnic diversification in politics, see: Y. Mounk, The People vs. Democ-
racy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, Cambridge 2018.
7 E.g.: T. Cooper, J. Thomas, Nature…, p. 25. 
8 See: Tackling the Information Crisis: A Policy Framework for Media System Resilience, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, London 2018.
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preexisting views9. This and the crumbling of the mainstream media system under the 
pressure of modern digital technology leads to the conclusion that political author-
ities must reinvent the regime of truth protection, if only they want to keep liberal 
democracy alive10.
At this point in time we cannot stop new media from being created or new modes of 
communication from emerging. The revolution had happened and we cannot undo it. 
So, in order to combat the crisis of democracy, we can only turn to substantive require-
ments to apply to communication, which are of crucial importance for the existence of 
liberal democracy. We need mechanisms that will favour and promote accurate infor-
mation in clash with incorrect one and impose restrictions on what can be expressed and 
disseminated. For decades such mechanisms have operated via the market of traditional 
media. But now this market has been disrupted by the invention of social platforms. 
Thus, it is the political authorities that should step up by employing various kinds of 
regulations. No wonder then that in response to the fake news invasion in the public 
discourse, the idea of legal interventions to protect the truth is presented by some 
authors as a reasonable expectation11.
It is expected that governments, law-makers and public institutions will be able 
to play a more active role in combating fake news and disinformation, especially if they 
have been deliberately deployed to disrupt democracy. What are the measures that can 
be employed to protect democratic, and thus rational, discourse? To answer this ques-
tion, it is critical to look at those cases when the law already stands to protect the truth.
2. Legal protection of personal truths
Let us start with the observation that an idea of a logical status of certain sentences 
being protected by the law is neither odd nor extraordinary12. Civil law as well as crimi-
nal law are endowed with various procedures designed to guarantee such protection. 
For example, under the Polish law, a person whose good name or dignity is endangered 
by a spread of false and defamatory information may sue an entity legally responsible 
for spreading that information, or even launch a criminal case against a defamer. Truth 
is also regulated in the press law, mainly in the form of a person’s or company’s right 
to demand that a disclaimer of false or inexact (incorrect) information be published13. 
However, not everybody has the right to initiate those procedures. According to the 
Polish Criminal Code14 or the Polish Civil Code15, it must be the person directly targeted 
9 In fact, as certain researches have demonstrated, it is in fact much worse, because voters may recognize a political 
candidate as insincere and inconsiderate, but support him anyway. Also, voters appreciate a candidate precisely 
because they recognize him as a “lying demagogue”. See: O. Hahl, M. Kim, E. Zuckerman Sivan, The Authentic 
Appeal of the Lying Demagogue: Proclaiming the Deeper Truth about Political Illegitimacy, “American Sociological 
Review” 2018/1, pp. 1–33.
10 The question of the truth playing a role of a necessary condition for liberal democracy is an important one, but is 
much too broad to discuss in this short essay.
11 See: T. Cooper, J. Thomas, Nature…, p. 197: “if a government’s primary role is the security and protection of its 
citizens, (…) it is incumbent on governments to step up to that role with regard to the digital environment”.
12 By the logical status of a sentence I mean the property of being true or false which is ascribed to a sentence by a certain 
language community.
13 I assume here that incorrect information is not necessarily false, and this is also a core idea behind the Polish regu-
lations contained in Article 31a of the Press Law (Polish title: Ustawa z 26.01.1984 r. – Prawo prasowe, tekst jedn.: 
Dz. U. z 2018 r. poz. 1914). 
14 Polish title: Ustawa z 6.06.1997 r. – Kodeks karny (tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 2020 r. poz. 1444).
15 Polish title: Ustawa z 23.04.1964 r. – Kodeks cywilny (tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 2020 r. poz. 1740).
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by false information. This means that your dignity or your good name must be damaged. 
In the case of the press law, you must be an entity (natural person, legal person or other 
organization) “interested” in disclaiming incorrect information, otherwise you are not 
entitled to make such a request16. Hence, truth protection in these particular cases relies 
on having a direct legal interest. However, this requirement is not strict. For example, 
according to the Polish press law, the right to disclaimer is extended also to a legal 
successor of a deceased person or organization. In the case of a natural person, this 
particular regulation seems to be aimed at the protection of a special value that western 
societies usually associate with an individual’s memory of a person. It is because of that 
value we let certain people, i.e. relatives of a deceased person, actively control the way 
others speak of the person17.
As we can see, the protection of a  logical status of certain sentences is already 
embodied in the law. It is limited only to the cases of false or inexact information regard-
ing individuals (natural persons, legal persons, organizations) and only individuals with 
a sufficiently close relation to the content of incorrect information are entitled to avail 
of this protection. Because of the personal nature of protected information I have 
coined the term “personal/private truth” to describe it. And because its protection is 
limited to individuals only, the term “personal/individual protection” will be used as the 
designation of the protection regime described above. Using this terminology, we can 
conclude that there exists at least individual protection of personal truths in the law, 
and it is achieved by actions of particular individuals such as litigation, charge, request.
But what about those bits of information (propositions, sentences) which transcend 
a merely personal truth? What about information which relates to a deceased person 
who has no living legal successor, or groups of persons, or facts? Is it even possible to sin-
gle out any cases when the law is used to protect the truth of sentences which are not 
reducible to sentences about someone’s personal affairs? Let’s now turn to memory laws.
3. Memory laws
The so-called memory laws are regulations designed to protect history, including facts 
about historical figures or certain groups (e.g. victims of war crimes, nations). Many 
countries decided to implement specific regulations into their legal systems especially 
to counteract misinformation about Shoah or other atrocities committed by totalitarian 
regimes throughout the 20th century18. Some authors claim that these regulations can 
be fully explained in terms of protection of dignity of victims or private memories of 
their living relatives. According to this approach, memory laws are in fact special cases 
of protection of those personal truths that concern historical events. In many cases 
this protection is exercised solely by individual actions. In the Polish case law there is 
a growing number of verdicts where courts have expanded the legitimacy of individuals 
in cases of false sentences regarding even the history of the nation, let alone a particular 
individual. The judge’s motivation was the role that history plays for personal dignity or 
16 It is a question for judicature and the legal doctrine to determine what the term “interested” means in this particular 
context.
17 In the case of organizations and companies, the reason is straightforward – a successor’s interests might be impaired 
by bad fame, so it seems right to let the successor protect its own business. A mere economic interest is usually 
everything we need to explain why the law affords certain organizations the right to protect truth in regard to their 
predecessors. 
18 See: N. Koposou, Memory Laws, Memory Wars. The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia, Cambridge 2017. 
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identity of the litigator, or even just affiliation of the litigator with the group defamed 
by historically incorrect information19. This view was later supported by some authors 
and seems to be an established position at least on the grounds of the Polish law20.
In general, however, memory laws are the instances of public law and their aim 
is to establish public protection of certain truths, not limited to individual’s interven-
tions. Some authors justify their public character by the instrumental value of public 
protection – defending the truth about past atrocities helps stopping the spread of 
hate crimes in the future21. This view seems to be in conformity with international law, 
especially with the interpretations of the Article 19 in conjunction with Article 20 of 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)22:
Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with the 
obligations that the Covenant imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom 
of opinion and expression (...) The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expres-
sions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events23.
According to this, the objective of memory laws lies in the protection of rights or 
reputations of others, or the protection of national security, public order, public health 
or morals and hence it is not just the protection of truth by itself24. In that case, the 
histor ical (i.e. regarding past events) defamation is subject to legitimate regulation 
as long as it, for example, damages the reputation of some groups, or individuals or 
nations, or creates sufficient conditions for hate crimes.
However, a number of authors take a different stance, focusing rather on the notions 
of collective memory or history as independent reasons for intervention by the state. 
In their opinion, memory is not only a private construct of a personal value. Collective 
memory and even history are constructed by various public means, simply because 
they are valuable for societies as they create the collective identity of a group such as 
a nation25. Thus, it is in the interest of the nation or the state to protect these constructs 
by public means, including legal interventions26. Thus, legal interventions are not only 
allowed, but even required when the memory and the history are distorted by dissemina-
tion of falsehood. And these interventions are not limited only to the cases of personal 
truths or individual’s interventions, when, for example, ex-prisoners of death camps or 
19 See: judgment of Białystok Appeal Court (Polish: Sąd Apelacyjny) of 30 September 2015 (I  ACa 403/15), 
LEX No. 1820409; judgment of the Olsztyn District Court (Polish: Sąd Okręgowy) of 24 February 2015 (I C 726/13),), 
LEX No. 1836004.
20 See eg.: M. Jabczuga-Kurek, Legitymacja czynna członka zbiorowości w nietypowych sprawach o ochronę czci i dobrego 
imienia [Eng. Entitlement of a community member in unusual cases for the protection of dignity and good name], in: 
B. Jelonek-Jarco, R. Kos, J. Zawadzka (eds.), Usus magister est Optimus. Rozprawy prawnicze ofiarowane Profesorowi 
Andrzejowi Kubasowi [Eng. Usus magister est Optimus. Legal treaties offered to Professor Andrzej Kubas], Warszawa 2016, 
pp. 75–77.
21 See: W. Brzozowski, Bezstronność światopoglądowa władz publicznych w Konstytucji RP [Eng. Ideological impartiality 
of the public authorities in the Polish Constitution], Warszawa 2011, pp. 156–167.
22 See: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.
23 See: General comment No. 34. Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression (CCPR/C/GC/34), United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, 12 September 2011, para. 49.
24 See: Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
25 See: A. Radwan, Między negacjonizmem a dyfamacją. Ustawodawca jako moderator dyskusji o przeszłości [Eng. Between 
negationism and defamation. The legislator as a moderator of discussions about the past], in: A. Radwan, M. Berent 
(eds.), Prawda historyczna a odpowiedzialność prawna za jej negowanie lub zniekształcanie [Eng. Historical truth and 
legal responsibility for its negation or distortion], Warszawa 2020, pp. 100–104.
26 For a comprehensive analysis of literature on this matter see e.g.: A. Radwan, Między negacjonizmem…, pp. 81–132.
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their organizations, or military combatants fighting with murderous regimes, go to court 
to sue those who disseminate false information about their past or about the history.
Memory and history are just an assemblage of sentences. Memory laws, thus, are an 
example of regulations aimed at protecting truths which are not merely private. Those 
truths could pertain to individuals or groups of individuals, but, more notably, also to facts. 
And their protection could be initiated by public institutions, not only by private persons.
As we see, the legal protection of truth is not limited to individual protection of per-
sonal truths only. In the case of memory laws, we could observe a tendency to establish 
a certain version of history by legislation and then to equip the state with legal means 
to defend it against being distorted. Notably, the protection of history is usually not 
justified by the necessity of protecting the rights or reputation of individuals, or public 
morals, or public order etc. Collective memory and history are legal values per se. And 
they contain not only sentences about particular persons or groups (i.e. victims of war), 
but also some general factual statements. Clearly the memory laws are examples of 
public protection of impersonal truths.
4. Public protection of consumers
Another case of public protection of factual knowledge is the system of consumer pro-
tection. This system establishes public offices and procedures responsible for, among 
other things, protection of information about products and services. That information is 
not personal, as it does not relate to any specific person. It is rather factual: it describes 
how a product or service works and how costly it is, etc. Consumer protection is all about 
providing consumers with factual knowledge necessary for rational consumer choices.
Some procedures of this system are initiated by individuals, other by authorities. 
For example, the Polish Act on Counteracting Unfair Market Practices introduces the 
concept of unfair, misleading market practice defined (partially) as dissemination of 
false information27. The protection regime consists of the right of misled consumers 
to litigate the infringer. But litigation is not limited to individuals, since certain offices, 
for example the ombudsman, have the right to litigate as well. Likewise, the Polish Act 
on Competition and Consumer Protection introduces the notion of practices infringing 
collective consumer interests and refers to a violation of the obligation to provide con-
sumers with reliable, true and full information as an example of such a practice28. Here 
the task of protection is entrusted to a special public office.
In both the cases, the subject of protection is information and correct information 
is protected publicly, by procedures defined by public law and initiated (also) by public 
authorities.
5. General factual knowledge and fake news
As we can observe, there are various measures designed to protect the correctness of 
information in the law. Some of them only protect information of personal pertinence 
that can influence a person’s reputation or social status. But even the protection of 
27 Act of 23 August 2007 on Counteracting Unfair Market Practices (Polish title: Ustawa z 23.08.2007 r. o przeciw-
działaniu nieuczciwym praktykom rynkowym, tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 2017 r. poz. 2070).
28 Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection (Polish title: Ustawa z 16.02.2007 r. o ochronie 
konkurencji i konsumentów, tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 2020 r. poz. 1076).
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personal information could be instituted by public authorities, since the way a person is 
remembered may have a public significance. And by introducing the notion of collective 
memory (history), we can even argue that factual (impersonal) knowledge about the 
past must fall under public protection, too. Consumer protection is yet another example 
of factual knowledge protected by public law.
For the purpose of seeking remedy for the crisis referred to in the first section of 
this paper, it is crucial to answer the question if factual knowledge in general could be 
legally protected. The reason behind is that fake news and disinformation which are 
spreading through social media are often targeted at factual knowledge. For example, 
various conspiracy theories about big pharma, vaccines, immigration, terrorism, hidden 
costs of an EU membership all include false sentences about facts.
In this case, we are looking for a system of protection that is capable of coping with 
factual knowledge and is not limited solely to sentences of personal significance. Such 
a system must therefore go beyond individual interests and provide for protection initi-
ated by public authorities, similarly to the cases of consumer protection or history laws. 
Moreover, such a system (or at least its description) should be comprehensive enough 
to incorporate consumer protection and memory laws and present them as instances 
of the general scheme.
At this point let me outline the notion that could be of use in laying down some 
details of how this general protection of factual knowledge could be structured.
6. Public interest as a general clause
The notion of public interest has been the subject of academic debates for years, 
mainly in the context of democracy and public administration theories. In the theory 
of democracy, it represents the idea of an active government which does not limit 
itself to satisfying the interests of particular groups, but transcending them in a way29. 
Since ancient Greece, it has been highly debatable how the phrase: “in a way” should 
be understood30. It remains quite clear, though, that in a number of legal acts the 
term “public interest” plays the role of a  general clause, i.e. a  general directive 
for the application and interpretation of law by public authorities31. It is worthy of 
note that the term seems to have a meaning similar to “social interest” or “socially 
justified interest”32.
In the field of political studies a slightly different definition was proposed by Walter 
Lippmann, who concluded that “the public interest may be presumed to be what [peo-
ple] would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and 
benevolently”33. This seemingly adds a requirement of rationality to the idea of public 
interest, bringing this notion closer to Rawls’ idea of public reason.
29 Readers interested in the origins of and essential introduction to various conceptions of public interest may refer 
to H. Elcock, The Public Interest and Public Administration, “Politics” 2006/2, pp. 101–109.
30 See: W.J. Stankiewicz, Aspects of Political Theory, London 1976, pp. 27–40.
31 Reportedly, the term “general clause” was used for the first time in: J.W. Hademann, Die Fluch in die Generalklauseln. 
Eine Gefahr für Recht und Staat [Eng. The Curse of the General Clauses. A Danger to the Law and the State], Tübingen 1933.
32 It appears that the notion of public interest coincides with the notion of social interest and partly deflects from the 
notion of socially justified interest. For more comprehensive analysis see: A. Żurawik, Interes publiczny, interes społecz ny 
i interes społecznie uzasadniony [Eng. Public interest, social interest and socially justified interest], “Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 2013/2, pp. 57–69.
33 W. Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy, New York 1956, p. 40.
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Another definition, however, was proposed in journalism, where George Brock 
identified the interests of collective identity, an advancement of benefit or a prevention 
of harm and free flow of information as the three requirements of public interest34. This 
area of studies on public interest is particularly interesting, since the concept of public 
interest is assumed as being fundamental for journalism. The media often describe 
themselves as missionaries of public good and employ their understanding of public 
interest as a signpost for their conduct. It is precisely because of that the concept and 
its applications have been a subject to a number of empirical studies in the area of 
journalism with rather interesting results.
David Morrison and Michael Svennevig interviewed media professionals and regula-
tors on their understanding of the notion of public interest and concluded that although 
major proportions of the public are familiar with the concept of public interest, “no 
rigorous definition is provided”35. In turn, other authors even claim that public inter-
est in journalism cannot be defined at all36. These findings are of course somewhat 
problematic, since they render the idea of having an operational criteria or objective 
standards for public interest simply fruitless. If media practitioners, who often rely on 
public interest as a justification for their controversial choices, could not even decipher 
what the term “public interest” means for them, how anybody could?
This observed inability of determining the operational criteria for deployment of 
the concept of public interest, even in a very practical context such as journalism, is 
responsible for the wide range of attitudes toward the concept displayed by academics. 
Some authors simply underscore its resemblance to other flexible and undetermined 
concepts like “common good” or “general will”, which are understood as an aggregation 
of individual interests37. Others rank the concept as “ill-suited to empirical research 
conducted according to accepted scientific standards”, specifically because of its diffu-
sion and fluidity38. There are also certain authors who believe that the public interest 
in democracy is in fact tantamount to the will of the political majority. For them, pub-
lic interest is just another way to cover up the pursuit of one’s own political agenda39. 
Finally, other authors propose an approach to understanding of this concept not as 
operational criteria for particular decision-making, but rather as an opportunity for 
deliberation on decisions and conduct, which is an important part of exercising public 
administration40. Thus, the concept of public interest is no longer seen as an ideal viable 
for public conduct, but a heuristic device useful for the analysis of this conduct.
This distinction is of a great importance. Although I will argue that in the context 
of public truth, public interest cannot play a role of a certain ideal of conduct, one can 
still use the notion as a tool to analyse and justify the regimes of public truth protection. 
I will expand on this idea shortly.
To recapitulate, there is no shortage of authors criticizing the use of the concept 
of public interest on the grounds of its vagueness and lack of empirical content which 
34 See: G. Brock, Out of Print. Newspapers, Journalism and the Business of News in the Digital Age, London 2013, pp. 192.
35 See: D. Morrison, M. Svennevig, The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy, London 2002; D. Morrison, M. Svennevig, 
The Defence of Public Interest and the Intrusion of Privacy: Journalists and the Public, “Journalism” 2007/1, pp. 44–65. 
36 J. Petley (ed.), Media and Public Shaming. Drawing the Boundaries of Disclosure, London 2013.
37 See: F. Bealey (ed.), Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science, Oxford 1999, p. 274.
38 See: D.F. Morgan, The Public Interest, in: T.L. Cooper (ed.), Handbook of Administrative Ethics, 2nd ed., New York 2001, 
pp. 166–167. 
39 See: H.G. Frederickson, Can Public Officials Correctly Be Said to Have Obligations to Future Generations?, “Public 
Administration Review” 1994/5, pp. 457–464.
40 T.L. Cooper, The Responsible Administrator, 4th ed., San Francisco 1998, p. 77.
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sometimes leads to its use as an excuse for implementing policies of the majority regard-
less of their actual value for the whole society. But even if no one knows what public 
interest actually means and even if this term may sometimes be exploited by authorities 
to justify arbitrary decisions, we can still defend this concept as a general clause. Suffice 
to say that fuzziness and a lack of precise determination of a concept are exactly what 
should be expected if it is used as a general clause in the law. General clauses are gen-
eral, unspecific, undetermined and vague – and exactly these features make them useful.
8. Need for a general protection of public truths
Previously I made an assumption that we need to enrich the theory of liberal democratic 
state with the idea of the system of protection designed to defend factual knowledge in 
response to fake news and disinformation campaigns. I believe that the notion of public 
interest helps us to describe and justify this proposal. As we remember, I distinguished 
between two different types of truths. Some of them are important only for certain indi-
viduals because incorrect information could damage their reputation, rights or even the 
memory of their relatives which they cherish. I refer to those truths as “private” or “perso-
nal”. Certainly, however, there is also information which is significant for society as such, 
not necessarily for any person in particular. Contrary to “personal” information, I referred 
to this kind of information as “public”. Although personal truths are usually protected 
by individual measures, i.e. litigation, charges and applications, public truths, on the other 
hand, on many occasions need to be protected by actions taken by authorities. It is mainly 
due to the fact that often there is no personal interest that could be ascribed by the law 
to a particular person in order to protect the information, for example in the court.
In the case of history or consumer protection, one could rationalize that the existing 
measures are necessary to protect the collective memory of the nation or to protect the 
society against hate speech, or to protect consumers against frauds. Admittedly, there 
are reasons that help us see the instrumental value of protection of public truths in 
those cases. Nonetheless, at the same time both those specific reasons fall in the broader 
category of public interest. It is fully acceptable to say that the protection of consumers 
or history (or the collective memory) lies in the public interest. What this term means 
is yet another question, but the term seems to be a convenient category one can apply 
to efficiently describe both these cases. The usefulness of this category becomes even 
more apparent once we turn to other cases of socially valuable factual knowledge. It 
is because in such cases it is often difficult to characterize the underlying reason for 
intervention that could play a role of instrumental justification for public protection. 
Let’s consider, for example, the case of vaccinations.
Despite the fact that vaccines contributed to eradicating or limiting a number of 
serious illnesses across the globe, a strong anti-vaccine movement has recently emerged 
in a way that somewhat resembles the other populistic trends. According to the World 
Health Organization, vaccination is one of the most cost-effective ways to prevent dis-
eases and it helps to avoid 2 to 3 million deaths a year41. At the same time, thanks to the 
changes in the media market and the proliferation of social media platforms, vaccina-
tion is highly and vigorously contested. As a result, the number of the vaccinated is 
41 See: 10 facts on immunization, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/mongolia/health-topics/vac-
cines/10-facts-on-immunization, accessed on: 19 August 2020.
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falling and illnesses which used to be considered eradicated are reappearing. Thus, the 
spread of the anti-vax hoax poses danger to the society and public health, lowering its 
herd immunity to various diseases. No wonder that the anti-vax movement (or “vaccine 
hesitancy” as it is sometimes called in official WHO’s documents) is considered one of 
the major threats to global health by WHO and threatens to reverse the progress made 
in tackling vaccine-preventable diseases42.
Hence, factual knowledge with no straightforward personal connotations is being 
widely questioned with the devastating result that threatens society and even the whole 
world. As highlighted above, we cannot stop the spread of the anti-vax hoax, or other 
similar instances of fake news and disinformation, by limiting or changing the infra-
structure of the internet, mainly due to its dispersed nature. We cannot vaccinate people 
against conspiracy theories or fake news, because their susceptibility to misinformation 
is part of the human condition. As an economist would probably put it, there are struc-
tural factors that seriously limit our choices here. The only thing we can in fact do is 
to confront fake news and misinformation directly.
Some might propose that we should do this by education, information campaigns 
and so on. Yet the efficacy of these particular measures is limited because sensational 
information always gains greater attention, especially when competing with “boring” 
scientific facts. On the other hand, if such campaigns could have reversed the effects 
of misinformation and fake news, we would limit our interventions to them even in 
cases of consumer protection or memory laws. But instead of doing just that, we have 
implemented certain legal measures, also in criminal law, simply because other options, 
such as education, failed. It is reasonable to expect that in the case of the anti-vax hoax 
we need to do exactly the same in order to tackle the misinformation pandemic. Thus, it 
is reasonable to argue that it is in the public interest to protect the scientific knowledge 
on vaccines and the notion of public interest can play a role in justifying this protection.
As mentioned earlier, there is a growing consent among researchers as well as polit-
ical leaders that states and authorities must intervene to limit the damage of spreading 
misinformation to societies. The notion of public interests is, hence, a convenient jus-
tification for any such intervention. If the public protection is justifiable in the cases 
of memory and consumers, it should be justifiable in the case of factual knowledge, 
scientific truths or other general statements valuable for society. In all those cases 
we may assume that certain actions (legal interventions) are taken by public authorities 
because there is no particular person entitled to protect the truth on his or her own. 
As soon as we recall the classic definitions of the term “public interest” as something 
that transcends the personal (individual) interest, we realize that the notion of public 
interest seems to be in the right place here. The public interest transcends personal 
(individual) interests just like public truths transcend personal truths.
9. Public protection of public truths and freedom of opinion
So far I have argued that in cases of certain impersonal, general statements, for example 
scientific knowledge, we might expect state authorities to proactively combat misin-
formation. The notion of public interest should play a role in the justification of legal 
42 See: Ten threats to global health in 2019, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/
ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019, accessed on: 19 August 2020.
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measures implemented to achieve this goal. Let us now turn to the question what exactly 
such a regime of protection should look like? Although describing all possible realiza-
tions exceeds the scope of this paper, some degree of detail can definitely be provided.
The main problem which we stumble upon at the very beginning of our consid-
erations is that any attempt to protect the logical status of certain sentences seems 
to be in conflict with freedom of opinion. Freedom of opinion and related freedom of 
expression are legal values protected at the level of domestic as well as international 
law43. Certainly, one can even defend the view that freedom of opinion is in fact a man-
ifestation of public interest. Thus, any system of protection of information must take 
into consideration the fact that citizens are legally entitled to speak freely, and thus 
to say things that are not true. Then again, definitely there are cases in which certain 
restrictions could be imposed, especially when they are necessary in view of respect 
for the rights or reputations of others and for the protection of national security or 
public order, or public health or morals44. In Poland’s domestic law, general principle 
introduced by the Article 31(3) of the Constitution states that any restrictions on the 
constitutional freedoms and rights must be necessary for the state security or public 
order, or for the protection of the environment, public health and morality, or freedom 
and rights of others. Although in the case of the so-called “vaccine hesitancy” we can 
hold that public health is in danger, yet it is difficult to justify in general that the state 
is entitled to restrict the citizens’ ability to challenge public truths by employing admin-
istrative measures or other manifestations of its authority.
Seemingly, the idea that the state guided by public interest can generally protect 
the truth is in conflict with the law in two different ways. Firstly, freedom of opinion is, 
as we see, protected by the law. Secondly, public interest cannot play a role in the jus-
tification of its limitation. In the Polish Constitution as well as in the ICCPR, the term 
“public interest” is not amongst the reasons for the limitation of freedom of opinion 
(or belief). On the contrary, other terms have been listed there as general clauses to be 
taken into consideration. Hence, is there a way to answer these concerns? Let us take 
the second one first.
It is indeed the case that public interest is not the justification for restricting free-
dom of opinion, either under national or international law. Therefore, state authorities 
cannot simply rely on public interest in their actions aimed at protecting the accuracy 
of any claims as long as those claims are within the scope of freedom of opinion (or 
belief). However, terms such as “national security”, “public order”, “public health” 
etc. can be interpreted as fitting into a broader conceptual category of public interest. 
In other words, the state actions to protect public health or public order etc. are, after 
all, actions in the public interest. Therefore, we can look at these terms as constituting 
a certain refinement, within the sphere of international and domestic law, of the general 
term “public interest” which in itself is perhaps too vague to be used directly. But, even 
if the latter term cannot play a role of a certain ideal for any specific behaviour, as it 
lacks an operationalized criterion for its usage, it can still play a role of a useful analytic 
tool for conceptual analysis of the actual, but also called-for regulations.
43 Here I use the terms taken from the article 19(1) and 19(2) of the ICCPR. In Polish law, the freedom of conscience, 
and therefore beliefs, and freedom of expression fall under, respectively, the Article 53(1) and the Article 54(1) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 (Polish title: Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
z 2.04.1997 r., Dz. U. Nr 78, poz. 483 ze zm.). 
44 See: Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
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In fact, let us consider the aforementioned cases of public truth protection, i.e. 
consumer protection and the memory laws. While in the first case we can say that the 
restriction of the freedom of opinion regarding products and services is motivated by the 
need to protect the rights of consumers (and thus in accordance with, for example, the 
Article 31(3) of the Polish Constitution), in the case of memory laws the matter gets 
more complicated. As we may recall, different justifications are possible here. Some 
will refer to national identity or pride, other to the concept of public order and hate 
speech. However, if we need to address these cases without deep-diving into detailed 
considerations just to grasp their common elements and properties, the notion of public 
interest could turn out to be handy. The same applies should we like to formulate some 
proposals of future regulations.
10. Sketch of the system
At this point I would like to attempt an explanation what public protection of public 
truth could look like, taking into account the fact that public truths lie within citizens’ 
freedom of opinion. At the outset, it is worth noting that the possibility of building 
a control regime based on a public body equipped with administrative powers to regu-
late a public debate seems to be downright out of question. The Orwellian Ministry 
of Truth (and anything that resembles it) simply does not fall within the legal stan-
dards currently in force. The existence of such a body would also raise concerns similar 
to those surrounding the concept of public interest. If, as claimed in the literature, the 
content of public interest mainly reflects the will and interests of the political majority, 
the idea that there would be an administrative body restricting the freedom of public 
debate in the public interest will always be somewhat troubling and suspicious.
Concerns about such a body will not be alleviated should we put forward a postulate 
that, instead of public interest, we will rather use the concepts of public security, public 
morality, public health etc. to define its operations. Yet, it can always be argued that 
all those concepts are, after all, also mere projections of a certain political majority. 
Public order is often equated simply with the current political system of the state, and 
the threat to public health implies a public health standard accepted by the current 
political majority. Hence, it is easy to imagine that state authorities are combating 
information provided, for example, by whistleblowers about the surveillance of citizens 
by secret services, or declarations of the rights and freedoms of persons whose sexual 
orientation or lifestyle is considered a deviation.
Thus, the Ministry of Truth model is not the available option for the public truths 
protection. Nonetheless, its drawbacks guide us to imagine what this protection could 
actually look like. Namely, in cases where legal values or standards are clashing, courts 
and tribunals are usually the right place to reconcile them. Therefore, also in the case 
of a collision between the freedom of opinion and the protection of truths, admittedly 
the courts should be the place where this conflict is resolved. In fact, this is exactly 
happening in cases of personal truths when particular individuals are going to court 
against other individuals or entities in order to suppress their freedom of opinions. 
In the case of public truths, as we remember, the problem lies in the absence of any 
specific entity designated by the law that could play the role of the litigator. Hence, 
I think that the most natural solution will be simply to expect that the existing public 
institutions will start to play a more active role within the limits of their statutory fields 
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of competence. This role could include, for example, educational activities, monitoring 
the press, submitting replicas or eventually going to court in cases where public interest 
has been violated as a result of disinformation.
It seems to be crucial importance to grant these institutions the right to appear in 
courts. And this could be achieved in the legal doctrine or judicature by underscoring 
the necessity of protection of public interest, explained in terms of public order, health, 
morality, reputation of persons or groups of people who require protection, and other 
sufficient legal reasons for restricting freedom of opinion. Also, public institutions are, 
after all, established for a specific purpose of fulfilling certain public interest (e.g. public 
health, public security, collective memory etc.). It is not at odds, therefore, to expect 
that they should respond to misinformation that could impair those goals. In order 
to acknowledge this, we need of course to employ the concept of public interest and 
recognize that the legal doctrine can legitimize public institutions as the court actors in 
cases when the public truth is in danger. As we can see, it seems, though, that the term 
“public interest” is necessary to establish this line of argument.
The acceptance by the legal doctrine of the view that certain public institutions are 
entitled to legal action in defence of the truth of sentences regarding their statutory 
goals is certainly not an unbelievable idea. As mentioned before, Polish courts have 
recently admitted that individuals have the right to protect a certain version of history 
and legally combat statements attributing responsibility for Nazi crimes to the Polish 
nation. Since public truths can be protected by appropriately extending the concept of 
personal interest, why not, then, employ the notion of public interest to justify protec-
tion of public truths by public institutions?
On the margin, the legal protection of history seems to be a good example here, 
because it is fulfilled by a specialized institution deliberately set up to actively shape 
public debate: the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). The methods of its oper-
ation as defined by the law include “dissemination in the country and abroad opinions 
regarding the most important historical events for the Polish Nation”, or “preventing 
the dissemination in the country and abroad of information and publications about 
untrue historical content, harming or defaming the Republic of Poland or the Polish 
Nation”45. In the context of our considerations, however, the most interesting seems 
to be the chapter on the Protection of the good name of the Republic of Poland and the 
Polish Nation, where Articles 53o and 53p explicitly state that this protection could be 
fulfilled by civil procedures appropriate for personal goods protection and that the 
Institute is empowered to litigate. Thus, by a decision of law-makers, the Institute of 
National Remembrance is capable of protecting a certain category of public truths in 
a civil court. As we keep in mind, a similar situation can be observed in the case of con-
sumer protection, where certain public institutions can file a complaint or even litigate.
But even in the absence of a direct and explicit regulation of this issue by the leg-
islator, it may be often rational to accept that certain public institutions are entitled 
to take legal action when information relevant to their area of competence is endan-
gered. For example, according to the law, the State Sanitary Inspection is established 
to implement public health tasks and one of the methods of its operation is to conduct 
educational and health activities in order to develop appropriate attitudes and health 
45 See: Article 53a(1) of the Act of 18 December 1998 on the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the 
Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Polish title: Ustawa z 18.12.1998 r. o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej 
– Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 1882).
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behaviours among citizens46. If we assume that the concept of “educational activity in 
order to develop appropriate attitudes” includes defence against disinformation, which 
seems to be quite non-controversial assumption, it could be argued that, even in the 
absence of explicit authorization by the legislator, the Inspection is entitled to appear 
in the court and litigate, let’s say, against the claims that undermine the effectiveness 
of vaccination.
Therefore, the regime of protection of public truths postulated here may entail that 
the already existing public institutions simply take legal action to limit the spread of 
incorrect information (or falsehood) on subjects that lie within their statutory compe-
tences while courts and other public institutions recognize those actions as legitimate. 
The task of the court would be to decide to what extent the interference of certain pub-
lic institutions falls within the scope of the constitutional and international standards. 
According to this approach, the argument that such interventions by public institutions 
would pose a threat to freedom of opinion seems to fade, primarily because the court is 
the place where conflicts of legal values or legal standards  are resolved. And the notion 
of public interest will serve as a convenient category for describing the reasons and 
nature of institutional involvement, as well as help to gain acceptance for it within the 
legal doctrine. The latter is of course necessary only as long as the lawmaker refrains 
from regulating the issue in a comprehensive manner, for example by granting certain 
public institutions an explicit competence to stand in the court.
11. Are public institutions able to cope with the public protection of the truth?
If we postulate the regime of public truths protection based on existing public institu-
tions, we must face certain problems that could be encountered in the functioning of 
every organization. Those problems, being the subject of organizational studies, may 
hinder, if not prevent, the effective protection against disinformation.
First of all, employees of any public institution tend to limit themselves to mat-
ters that they can do routinely, without going beyond the scope of their established 
and clearly defined duties. Yet, in order to be effective, the protection of public truth 
requires not only constant monitoring of the public debate and statements that are 
formulated within it, but also a prompt response to them and this may exceed the 
capabilities of the existing public institutions. The issue of disclosure of crimes on the 
initiative of law enforcement agencies could serve as an illustration of this problem. 
There is plenty of at least anecdotal evidence that law enforcement agencies, despite 
having broad competences to act proactively, are usually reactive and rarely take action 
without a notice. It is difficult to expect that, for example, the State Sanitary Inspection 
will act any differently, especially since its employees have competencies quite other 
than appearing in courts in cases concerning, after all, semantics. Suffice to say that even 
a simple monitoring of the public debate can cause problems for officials as it means 
either additional duties for those already employed or a need for new job positions. 
Both are always a problem because of budget and time constraints.
So, it is naïve to expect that a set of largely autonomous public institutions will be 
able to provide the required level of protection for public truths. They simply lack both 
46 See: the Act of 14 March 1985 on the State Sanitary Inspection (Polish title: Ustawa z 14.03.1985 r. o Państwowej 
Inspekcji Sanitarnej, tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 59).
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human resources and professional knowledge, but also an appropriate level of coordi-
nation that must be provided.
One can argue that the answer to this issue is to rely on the initiative of the citizens 
who could play the role of a watchdog. Here, again, we come across psychological or 
sociological limitations. It is difficult to expect that citizens will organize themselves 
sufficiently to guarantee a comprehensive monitoring of public space and not only ini-
tiate relevant procedures in appropriate public institutions, but also follow on their 
outcomes. Non-governmental organizations could perhaps be better suited to play this 
role, as they do in the cases of counteracting corruption or monitoring the mechanisms 
of democracy.
Either way, as we see, we come to the conclusion that public protection of public 
truths requires not only the development – by the doctrine, jurisprudence or lawmak-
ers’ actions – of a certain concept of public interest related to such truths, but also 
the emergence of some kind of a “coordinating body”. The task of this body would be 
to identify cases of misinformation and initiate action by relevant public institutions. It 
would therefore play the role of “truth spokesman” of some kind. Such a coordinating 
body should not have the power to sanction or compel, but could still be important. 
And, what is more, it could also be a public institution, established by statutory law.
12. A spokesman for the truth
What might this coordinating body look like? Let us examine another area of the law, 
where we are dealing with similar circumstances, namely, with a number of independent 
public institutions acting to protect a specific public interest. Specialized institutions 
have been set up in many countries to promote and monitor the observance of human 
rights. These institutions have different mandates, but their common goal is to receive 
and investigate complaints about alleged human rights violations. As a rule, these insti-
tutions are public bodies.
Having a specialized institution with a strong democratic mandate and a broad inde-
pendence to protect the truth would be of great value. Such an institution could be 
a place where citizens might turn to signal cases of public truth violations, and hired 
or elected officials working for that institution could act accordingly, relying on their 
professional knowledge. It is a  matter of a  future discussion if such an institution 
should only play a role of a middle man merely signalling violations to other public 
institutions, or should have the right to go to court directly. In the latter case, it would 
resemble the Speaker of the Public Interest, an institution functioning in Poland dur-
ing the period of 1997–2007 that investigated cases of collaboration with the former 
communistic regime47.
A number of scientific papers and empirical research have been devoted to the issue 
of human rights institutions, so I will not elaborate this topic any further. Suffice to say 
that the model of operation of these institutions (the ombudsman model), is a part of 
a broader pattern of a model of dispute resolution which has recently become more 
47 See: the Act of 11 April 1997 on disclosure of work or service of persons performing public functions in state security 
organs or cooperation with them in the years 1944–1990 (Polish title: Ustawa z 11.04.1997 r. o ujawnieniu pracy 
lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944–1990 osób pełniących funkcje 
publiczne, tekst jedn.: Dz. U. z 1999 r. Nr 42, poz. 428). 
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significant in both civil and administrative justice systems48. In this broader conceptual 
and organizational framework, one can therefore look for inspiration for specific solu-
tions that provide an effective level of public protection for public truths. Although, 
strictly speaking, the ombudsman institution has historically served the purpose of 
supervising the proper functioning of public administration in relation to citizens, not 
to protect public goods like information49.
The ombudsman for the public truth seems to be also an answer to the institutional 
limitations I have described above. First of all, the problem with initiating interven-
tions disappears, because such interventions would take place at the request of the 
ombudsman, who, depending on the specific regulations adopted, could even go directly 
to court. Thus, employees of public institutions would not be required to assume a pro-
active role and would attend to their regular duties. Secondly, it would also be easier for 
officials to justify that their interventions are in the public interest, since they take place 
at the request of the ombudsman who, by definition, represents the public interest. This 
argument will, of course, largely depend on the degree of democratic legitimacy of the 
institution of the ombudsman and its authority. But regardless of the solutions finally 
adopted, the introduction of such an institution seems to be an important step on the 
path to building efficient mechanisms for protecting the public truth.
13. Final remarks
I am fully aware that many topics raised in this paper require further careful considera-
tion. However, my intention was to signal the existence of the problem in the first place 
and to indicate solutions possible from the point of view of jurisprudence. The truth 
is a universal value in all liberal democracies. It is an essential element of a rational 
discourse and a prerequisite for effective political intervention50. Though, in times of 
unprecedented spread of disinformation, defending the truth becomes one of the most 
pressing problems in contemporary politics.
While in the case of certain sentences, the protection of the truth can be effectively 
implemented through individuals’ actions in court, in the case of sentences of funda-
mental significance for society, public interventions seem vital. General justification of 
such interventions could be formulated in the language of public interest.
In practice, the regime of protection of public truths can be dispersed. Instead of 
having a single office in charge for public truth, which could immediately evoke fears 
of censorship, I propose to act through the existing public institutions operating within 
their statutory competences. However, the proposed system requires coordination and 
it seems a good idea to expand it with a special ombudsman institution that would play 
the role of a spokesman for the truth. Such an institution could either simply initiate 
action by public institutions or could also be empowered to appear in courts.
I hope these rough ideas will inspire further discussion and contribute to doctrinal 
development of an effective protection of truth.
48 See: M. Hertogh, R. Kirkham, The Ombudsman and Administrative Justice: From Promise to Performance, in: M. Hertogh, 
R. Kirkham (eds.), Research Handbook on the Ombudsman, Cheltenham 2018, pp. 1–15.
49 See: L. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance 
and Human Rights Protection, “Harvard Human Rights Journal” 2000/13, pp. 5–6.
50 I am aware that certain prominent proponents of liberal democracy have a different opinion, but I will not elaborate 
on this issue here. Readers can find more on the subject in: J. Cohen, Truth and Public Reason, “Philosophy & Public 
Affairs” 2009/1, pp. 2–42.
23Public Truths and Their Legal Protection
Public Truths and Their Legal Protection
Abstract: In this paper I deal with two key concepts of a modern political theory, i.e. truth 
and public interest, and examine relationships between them. This subject seems particularly 
important in the context of the observed crisis of the liberal democracy and the spread 
of misinformation and fake news. I  argue that there is a need to create a public system  
of protection designed to defend the logical status of those statements which have a value for 
the society. By using the notion of public interest as a tool for analysis, I demonstrate how 
such a system might be structured. I suggest employing existing public institutions to construct 
a system of public protection of the truth, yet supplemented by a coordinating body based on 
the ombudsman model.
Keywords: post-truth, disinformation, public interest, personal truths, public truths, factual 
knowledge, public protection of truth, ombudsman institutions, spokesman of truth
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